

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Floyd Steven Collins, Jr., #5253-K,)	C/A No. 0:06-391-TLW-BM
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	
South Carolina Department of Corrections,)	
)	
Defendant(s).)	

Plaintiff has filed this matter, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although he is an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), he is incarcerated at the Pickens County Detention Center (PCDC) for “safekeeping”. Prior to his transfer to the PCDC, he was incarcerated at the Lee Correctional Institution (LCI).

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 60 U.S.L.W. 4346, 118 L.Ed.2d 340, 112 S.Ct. 1728, (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325, (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, (1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

Pro se complaints and petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Leeke v. Gordon, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint or petition filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint submitted in the above-captioned case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff alleges that, while at LCI, he slipped and fell in the shower on December 7, 2005, fracturing his back in two places. He maintains he was not provided with adequate medical care because staff at LCI did not believe he was injured. According to the plaintiff, x-rays taken on December 28, 2005 revealed he had fractured his back. Plaintiff was told his back was fractured during a visit with Dr. John Pate on January 18, 2006. Plaintiff seeks damages for the forty-two (42) days he was denied medical assistance and showers. He also asks that "...the conditions of his confinement be changed for the better." *See Complaint. @ 5.*

The sole defendant named in this case, the "South Carolina Department of Corrections", is an agency of the State of South Carolina. As such, it is not necessary for the defendant to file an answer, because the defendant is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. *See Alden v. Maine*, 527 U.S.



706, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); *See also* Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, et. al., 122 S. Ct 1864, 2002 WL 1050457 (U.S. May 28, 2002) (state sovereign immunity precluded Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a non-consenting State). Although the State of South Carolina has consented to suit in state court under certain circumstances, it has not consented to suit in a federal court. *See* S. C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e)(Law. Co-op. 2004), which expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State. Therefore, since the defendant named in the above-captioned case may not be sued in a federal court, it is not necessary to make a recommendation regarding the remaining issues.

The plaintiff is, of course, free to file another suit against individual persons as defendants. If he does so, however, he must set forth specific factual allegations to show how any individual he names as a Defendant participated in conduct which he contends violated his constitutional rights. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) [In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege that 1) a named defendant deprived him or her of a federal right, and 2) did so under color of state law.].

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See* Denton v. Hernandez, *supra*; Neitzke v. Williams, *supra*; Haines v. Kerner, *supra*; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. * (4th Cir. 1993), *replacing*

unpublished opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir. 1993); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Respectfully Submitted,



Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge

Columbia, South Carolina

March 16 , 2006

The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.



Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"

&

The **Serious** Consequences of a Failure to Do So

The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period for filing objections, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must *specifically identify* the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made *and* the basis for such objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 8250 (D.S.C. 1992); and Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 776 (D. Utah 1995). Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, *supra*, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * * * We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * *
* A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger *de novo* review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the plaintiff of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright v. Collins, *supra*; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201

